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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This appeal raises two general issues. The first is 
extremely important to the efficient state regulation of occupa-
tions and profession. It deals generally with the main issue 
first raised before this Court in Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124 
(Utah 1983) . Vance dealt with the issue whether the general 
disciplinary standard of "unprofessional conduct* as it related 
to the treatment of patients could be found by a professional 
peer review board on a case by case and based in part upon the 
knowledge possessed by the board's professional members. The 
major issue in this case is similar: May the Real Estate Commis-
sion ("the Commission") delegate a case alleging violations of 
the general disciplinary standard "being unworthy or incompetent" 
to an Administrative Law Judge ? Collateral and assuming an 
affirmative answer thereto, does the Vance decision cover a 
Commission decision based upon a recommended decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") who finds a violation of a 
general standard without first finding a more specific discipli-
nary violation? The second general issue is whether the District 
Court exceeded the proper scope of review in overturning certain 
findings of fact made by the Commission? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the decision of Omer J, Call, First 
Judicial District Court Judge. Judge Call overturned the 
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d e c i s i o n of t h e Utah Rea l E s t a t e Commission. The C o m m i s s i o n ' s 
d e c i s i o n a p p r o v e d a recommended d e c i s i o n of t h e ALJ t o whom the 
c a s e had been a s s i g n e d f o r h e a r i n g . The ALJ a d j u d g e d Respondent 
g u i l t y of s e v e r a l l i c e n s i n g v i o l a t i o n s i n c l u d i n g " b e i n g unworthy 
or i n c o m p e t e n t Vo a c t a s a p r i n c i p a l b r o k e r . . . i n such manner 
a s t o s a f e g u a r d t h e I n t e r e s t s of the p u b l i c " and recommended t h a t 
h i s l i c e n s e t o p r a c t i c e a s a p r i n c i p a l r e a l e s t a t e b r o k e r be s u s -
pended for 150 d a y s f o l l o w e d by a t h r e e y e a r p r o b a t i o n a r y p e r i o d . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Nick Top ik ( "Respondent ) i s a r e a l e s t a t e b r o k e r 
l i c e n s e d i n t h e S t a t e of Utah , and a t a l l t i m e s m a t e r i a l h e r e t o , 
was a c t i n g i n h i s c a p a c i t y as a r e a l e s t a t e b r o k e r . 
On J a n u a r y 2 6 , 1983 , the D i v i s i o n , b a s e d upon e i g h t 
f a c t s s i t u a t i o n s , c h a r g e d Respondent , by p e t i t i o n and o r d e r t o 
show c a u s e , w i t h one c o u n t of w i l l f u l or d e l i b e r a t e v i o l a t i o n or 
d i s r e g a r d of t h e r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s of t h e Commiss ion , one 
c o u n t of s u b s t a n t i a l m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , one c o u n t of making f a l s e 
p r o m i s e s of a c h a r a c t e r l i k e l y t o i n f l u e n c e , p e r s u a d e or i n d u c e , 
one count of f a i l i n g t o v o l u n t a r i l y f u r n i s h c o p i e s of a l l 
documents to a party in a real estate transaction, one count of 
dishonest dealing and one count of being unworthy or incompetent 
to act as a real es tate broker. £££ Pet i t ion. 
On April 23, 1984, the Division amended the or ig inal 
Pe t i t ion to include an addit ional fact s i t u a t i o n and charged 
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Respondent with seven counts of wi l l fu l or del iberate v i o l a t i o n 
or d is regard of the rules and regulat ions of the Commission, two 
counts of subs tant ia l misrepresenta t ion, two counts of making 
f a l s e promises of a character l i k e l y to influence, persuade or 
induce, two counts of f a i l i n g to voluntari ly furnish copies of 
a l l documents to a .party in a rea l es ta te t ransac t ion , one count 
of dishonest dealing and one count of being unworthy or incompe-
t e n t to act as a real e s t a t e broker. £&£ Amended Pe t i t ion* 
On August 27 and 28, 1984 a hearing was conducted on 
the Amended Pe t i t ion . At the hearing, Fact Si tuat ion Number 
e igh t and the v io la t ions in connection therewith were dismissed 
without prejudice. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order a t 15. 
On August 31, 1984 the ALJ hearing the case concluded 
t h a t Respondent was gui l ty of f a i l ing to furnish v o l u n t a r i l y 
copies of a l l documents to a l l pa r t i e s executing the same, being 
unworthy or incompetent as to five of the fact s i t u a t i o n s , 
subjec t ing a se l l e r to double commissions, and adver t i s ing a 
property at a lower price than l i s t e d without wr i t ten consent . 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 15, 16. 
On September 11 , 1986, the Real Estate Commission 
considered the recommendations of the ALJ and affirmed h i s 
d e c i s i o n . Findings of Fact , Conclusions of Law, and Order a t 17. 
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Thereafter, Respondent appealed the Commission's 
decision to the First Judicial District Court* 
The District Court decided the case on January 15, 
1986/ by Memorandum Decision. 
Before the District Court, Respondent argued that Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-2-11(8) was unconstitutionally vague* The 
Commission and Division argued that Section 61-2-11(8) was not 
unconstitutionally vague under Vance V. FQldhaiD, 671 P.2d 124 
(Utah 1983) . The District Court concluded that Vance did not 
apply because the case was heard by an ALJ. The District Court 
further concluded that "incompetence or unworthiness" cannot be 
found by an ALJ "except and unless the broker's conduct also 
violates one or more of the other seventeen listed proscribed 
activities." Memorandum Decision at 3. 
The District Court also concluded that the following 
findings of facts and conclusions of law by the Commission were 
unsupported by the evidence: The Commission found that (1) 
Respondent failed to furnish copies to all the parties of the 
transaction, (2) Respondent subjected a seller to a double 
commission, and (3) Respondent paid an illegal finders fee to an 
unlicensed person. 
The fact situations at issue are as follows:. 
- A 
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FACT SITUATION NO. ,1 
This fact situation involves the dealings of Mr. Topik 
with Rosalee Tsosie, who was the owner of certain real property 
located in Brigham City, Utah. With respect to this Fact Situa-
tion the Commission found that Mr. Topik violated S 61-2-11(9) by 
failing to furnish Ms. Tsosie with a copy of the completed 
listing agreement. Findings of Fact, % 6. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of 
the Commission's findings of fact relate to the violation of S 
61-2-11(9) . 
On November 5th or 6th Mr. Topik visited Ms. Tsosie 
about obtaining a listing on her property. In the presence of 
Ms. Tsosie, Mr. Topik filled in certain terms of the listing 
agreement in blue ink, including the listing and expiration 
dates, the name of the realty company, the commission percentage, 
the date of execution and the city and state. £&£ Exhibit No. 4; 
Transcript at 38. Mr. Topik caused Ms. Tsosie to affirm accep-
tance of the listing agreement and acknowledge receipt thereof by 
signature. Transcript at 38. At the hearing Mr. Topik explained 
that later in his office he filled out the remainder of the 
listing agreement in black ink, including the loan balance 
amount, percentage interest rate on that loan/ the loan payment 
amount, the annual cost of taxes, and certain facts relative to 
the home such as square footage, number of bedrooms, bathrooms, 
improvements, etc. J&+. Mr. Topik also testified that he did not 
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recall providing Ms. Tsosie with a copy of the completed listing 
agreement. l£L Based upon this evidence the Commission 
concluded that Mr. Topik had failed to provide Ms. Tsosie with a 
completed copy of the listing agreement. 
FACT SITUATION NQ, 2 
On March 28, 1985, Antonio Gonzales listed his property 
on South Highway 89, Perry, Utah with Wardley Corporation. Divi-
sion's Exhibit 6. The listing was to expire on September 28, 
1982 and was published by the Brigham-Tremonton Multiple Listing 
Service of which Mr. Topik was a member. Transcript at 50. 
Sometime in July, 1982, Mr. Gonzales telephoned Wardley 
and informed the office manager that the property was being fore-
closed and that Wardley might want to come and take down its sign 
because he was terminating the listing agreement. Transcript at 
52. On July 31, 1982, Mr. Gonzales visited the office of Mr. 
Topik inquiring about certain rental property. Transcript at 59. 
At that time Mr. Topik approached Mr. Gonzales about listing the 
property to be foreclosed. Transcript at 58. Mr. Gonzales 
explained to Mr. Topik that he had verbally attempted to termi-
nate the listing agreement with Wardley Corporation and based 
upon such allowed Mr. Topik to list the property. JJL. 
The Commission with respect to Fact Situation 2 found 
that Mr. Topik knew or should have known that one party to a 
listing agreement could not unilaterally terminate the agreement 
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and that Mr. Topik was under a duty to make a reasonable inquiry 
to assure that the prior listing was no longer in effect. The 
Commission thus concluded that Mr. Topik was unworthy or incompe-
tent to act as a principle broker, broker, or salesman so to 
protect the public interest because he subjected Gonzales to 
liability for paying for two commissions and failed to make a 
reasonable inquiry to assure that the Wardley listing was no 
longer in effect. 
FACT SITUATION NQ, 3 
Joan Stephens listed her property at 672 North, 100 
West in Brighara City, Utah with Mr. Topik for $65,000 on July 14, 
1983. Transcript at 41. Ms. Stephens agreed to a counter offer 
to sell the property for $60,000 with $5,000 down at 11% 
interest. Transcript at 93, 94. The counter offer was rejected 
by the prospective purchaser. Mr., Topik testified that he 
. believed that on the basis of Ms. Stephens counter offer of July 
14, 1983 that he had authority to list the property for $60,000 
with $5,000 down and at 11 percent interest. I^ L. 
The Commission found that Mr. Topik had no written or 
verbal authority to advertise the property for under $64,100. 
Findings of Factr 1 13* Nevertheless, Mr. Topik listed the 
property at various prices including $60,500 (July 5, 1983 
hotsheet) $59,800 (August 10f 1983 hotsheet) $61,000 (August 23, 
1983 hotsheet) and $60,000 (September 7, 1983 hotsheet). 
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On Augus t 1 4 f 1983 Ms. Stephens wrote Mr. Topik a 
Letter after she had gained knowledge of the August 10, 1983 
Listing price of $59,800 which reads in part: 
I just heard the ad you placed in the 
Boxelder News and Journal, and I arc very 
disappointed and upset about i t . . . . I have 
told you every time what ray terms are—the 
same as the last offer, when I was at your 
place in July. 
As a result of your last ad, many people 
have been bothering the renters. . . . 
Transcript at 100. 
On the basis of the foregoing the Commission concluded 
that Mr. Topik violated Rule 11.f. of the Rules and Regulations 
of the Division of Real Estate which states that "[ulnder no 
circumstances should a broker or salesman advertise property at a 
lower price than l isted without the written consent of the 
sel ler ." 
FACT SITUATION NQ. 4 
With respect to Fact Situation No. 4 the Commission 
concluded that Mr. Topik violated S 61-2-11(8). Conclusions of 
Law, 1 4. The basis of that conclusion appears to be the promo-
tional flyer printed and distributed by Mr. Topik which offered 
to give a $100 gift certificate to any person "when we list and 
sell your home or one referred by you." Division1s Exhibit 12. 
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FACT SITUATION NO. 5 
Fact Situation No. 5 was resolved in favor of Mr. 
Topik. 
FACT SITUATION NO, 6 
On behalf of Donald and Eleanor Spears, Mr. Topik 
prepared on February 10, 1983 an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase a property located in Brigham City. Divisions 
Exhibit H; Transcript at 150. Many of the terras of the proposed 
purchase were given in the Earnest Money Agreement. However, 
when Mr. Topik presented the Earnest Money Offer to the listing 
broker, the broker noted several deficiencies in terras. Mr. 
Topik took the earnest money agreement from the broker and wrote 
in on line 24 and 25 "buyer will apply for a General Electric 
loan. Seller to pay 3H points." On lines 28 and 29 Mr. Topik 
filled in the terras relating to the interest rate and date of 
closing. Mr. Topik then handed the document back to the listing 
broker and requested that the offer be presented to the sellers 
without returning it to the prospective buyers for consent. The 
Commission found with respect thereto that Mr. Topik 
•demonstrated incompetence within the meaning of S 61-2-11(8). 1 
FACT SITUATION NO. 7 
On March 22, 1983, Mr. Topik prepared another Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for Donald and 
Eleanor Speers, in which the Speers offered to purchase certain 
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property in Brigham City. See Division Exhibit 17. The total 
purchase price was listed at $38,000 and $50 was listed as 
earnest money. The balance should have been listed at $37,950f 
but was listed at $37,000. The hearing officer held that the 
defective listing of the balance was incompetence within the 
meaning of S 61-2-11(8). 
FACT SITUATION NQ. 8 
At hearing the Division made a motion to dismiss Fact 
Situation No. 8 and the counts associated therewith without 
prejudice, which motion was granted by the Commission. 
FACT SITUATION NQ. 9 
Sometime in April, 1983, Addie Rucker decided to sell 
her Brigham City home. Fred Mayne, Mrs. Rucker's 87-year-old 
neighbor, agreed verbally to purchase the home for $45,800; 
terms: $5,000 down, assumption of a mortgage of $15,800; $25,000 
to be paid at closing; and closing was scheduled on June 15, 
1983. Mayne paid Rucker the $5,000 down in early May, 1983. 
Transcript at 166, 191. 
Mayne thereafter decided to sell the property and 
approached Topik about working out a deal. Mayne told Topik that 
he had purchased the Rucker home and wished to turn it over for 
$2f500 or $3,000. Transcript at 232. 
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On Hay 24, 1983, Topik and Mayne executed an Earnest 
Money Rece ip t and Offer to Purchase wherein Topik agreed to 
purchase t h e Rucker home from Mayne for $49,500; terms: $500 
Earnest Money; $4,500 payment when Mayne a c c e p t s the s a l e ; $3,000 
when Mayne d e l i v e r s the deed; assumption of e x i s t i n g mortgage of 
$15,915.25 and $25,584.75 loan from Mayne to Topik payable a t 
$200/month, 9% i n t e r e s t , D i v i s i o n ' s E x h i b i t 19 . Topik and Mayne 
a l s o execu ted a l i s t i n g agreement on the p r o p e r t y wherein "Topik 
ETAL ( T r u s t ) " was des igna ted as the owner. Respondent ' s Exhib i t 
L. 
Later t h e same day, Topik completed another l i s t i n g 
agreement on the p roper ty wherein "Nick Topik ETAL" was l i s t e d as 
owner. R e s p o n d e n t ' s Exhibi t K. This agreement l i s t e d the p r i c e 
a t $55,000 and i n d i c a t e d tha t the owner would accept a 104% wrap-
around mortgage wi th $12,500 down and $450/month payments. 
On May 27, 1983, Topik prepared a second Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase which a l t e r e d the purchaser , 
l i s t i n g Mr. Topik as such and the terms of s a l e : $49,500 s a l e s 
p r i c e ; $560 Ea rnes t Money to Rucker; $15,800 assumption; $25,600 
to Rucker t o l o a n from Mayne ($200/raonth fo r 36 years a t 9%) and 
presumably, $7,540 cash a t c los ing . D i v i s i o n ' s Exhibi t 18« 
Apparently, Mr. Topik decided to buy the property d irec t ly from 
Rucker and pay Mayne a $2,500 finders f e e . After Mrs. Rucker had 
executed the document, Rucker took a copy to Mayne for approval, 
but before doing so added a few addit ional terras. 
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On June 4, 1983f Kevin and Jill Jeppsen, for whom Topik 
had been trying to locate a home, made a full price offer for the 
Rucker property. "Again, two Earnest Money agreements (Division 
Exhibits 20 and 21), bearing the same date, were executed*" 
1 32, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. On the 
first agreement, Topi'k noted that he was a real estate broker and 
obtained Mr. Jeppsen's signature only. Division's Exhibit 20. 
On the second agreement, which both Mr. and Mrs. Jeppsen signed, 
Topik did not specify that he was a real estate broker. Divi- . 
sion's Exhibit 21. The second agreement is silent about the 
first and does not specify whether it supersedes the first or if 
the Earnest Money paid on the first is to be applied to the 
second. 
On June 15, 1983, the sale was closed. Mayne was paid 
a $2,500 finders fee and Topik arranged to take his profit from 
the Jeppsens over 36 years at $104/month. Division's Exhibit 24. 
The Commission ruled that Topik1s "preparation of mul-
tiple documents (presumably two multiple Earnest Money Agreements 
executed on behalf of Jeppsens) with no indication of which was 
to be binding, his failure to account for earnest monies being 
transferred from one document to another, and his addition of 
terms (however innocuous) after the agreement had been signed 
constituted incompetence within the meaning of S 61-2-11(8)." 
Order at 36, 37. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Vance v. FordhaiDf supra, this Court held that the 
general disciplinary standard of "unprofessional conduct" was not 
imperraissably vague where a group of professional peers defined 
the standard on a case by case basis as it related to the 
treatment of patients. 
In the present case, the Court is asked to clarify an 
issue not resolved in Y&n££, to take YaiKLfi one step further and 
allow a peer review board to delegate authority to an ALJ to hear 
such a case and based upon the ALJ's recommended decision find a 
violation of a similar disciplinary standard. 
The basis for the foregoing request lies in the effi-
cient administration of all occupations and profession. As the 
number of professional licensees increase and as State resources 
dwindle, the need for administrative law judges becomes more and 
more apparent. With respect to regulation of some occupations 
and professions, peer review boards are able to hear all licensee 
disciplinary hearings. But with respect to the vast majority of 
professions and occupations, such as with the regulation of real 
estate licensees, peer review boards simply do not have the time 
to devote to hearing all disciplinary cases. Furthermore, if the 
State is to effectively use the expertise made available to it by 
peer review boards, such boards cannot be engaged exclusively for 
hearing cases. 
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Additionally, the lower court under the guise of 
concluding that the general d i sc ip l ina ry standard of "being 
unworthy or incompetent" was overly vague and ambiguous has 
c a l l e d in to question the very process by which the Leg i s l a tu r e 
has es tab l i shed hearings which are designed to guarantee rea l 
» 
e s t a t e l i c e n s e e s d u e ' p r o c e s s . 
Thus , i t becomes n e c e s s a r y t o dec ide w h e t h e r t h e 
h e a r i n g p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d f o r r e a l e s t a t e l i c e n s e e s and 
e x e r c i s e d r e l a t i v e t o t h i s c a s e i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n f i r m . Of 
c o u r s e , i t i s the p o s i t i o n of t h e A p p e l l a n t t h a t (1) d e l e g a t i n g a 
c a s e f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e an ALJ, (2) a l l o w i n g t h e ALJ t o f i n d a 
v i o l a t i o n of a g e n e r a l d i s c i p l i n a r y s t a n d a r d , (3) r e q u i r i n g t h e 
ALJ t o t r a n s m i t a recommend o r d e r t o g e t h e r w i t h recommended 
f i n d i n g s of f ac t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law to t h e p e e r r e v i e w b o a r d 
f o r r e v i e w , and (4) r e q u i r i n g a p r o f e s s i o n a l p e e r r e v i e w b o a r d t o 
r e v i e w t h e recommended d e c i s i o n and c o n s i d e r t h e A L J ' s 
recommended d e c i s i o n in l i g h t of knowledge g a i n e d i n t h e c o u r s e 
of e n g a g i n g in the p r o f e s s i o n i s no t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e p u g n a n t . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE 
APPLICATION OF A VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS STANDARD 
OR BY AN IMPROPER HEARING 
Respondent b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t Cour t argued t h a t Utah 
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Code Ann, § 61-2-11(8) (1953 as amended)1 is impermissably vague 
and uncertain. The lower court, notwithstanding Vance, ruled in 
favor of Respondent reasoning: 
The Commission relies also on the Vance vs. 
Fordham Case wherein the court held that 
, "unprofessional conduct" in a medical doctor 
licensing case was an adequate statutory stan-
dard and arguing therefore "being unworthy or 
incompetent'" in a real estate broker's case is 
likewise an adequate statutory standard. Com-
mission counsel noted that in the Vance case 
the [sic] referred to standards of performance 
wpuld be interpreted by members of the profes-
sion in the process of administrative adjudi-
cation and equates that to other brokers 
filing the charges herein, even though no 
other brokers appeared and testified at the 
hearing before the ALJ. . . . 
This court does not accept the Divisions 
[sic] conclusions as to the application of 
the Vance interpretation to the case at bar 
and therefore rejects the findings of the AIJ 
of violations of 61-2-11(8), except and 
unless the broker's conduct also violated one 
or more of the other seventeen listed . 
proscribed activities- • .. • 
Memorandum Decision at 3 (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-11(8) states: 
The Commission . . • may • . . suspend, 
revoke, [or] place on probation . .. any 
license • • • if the licensee in performing 
or attempting to perform any of the acts 
specified in this chapter is found guilty of: 
(8) Being unworthy or incompetent to act 
as a principal broker, associate broker, or 
salesagent in such manner as to safeguard the 
interests of the public. 
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Aside from the fact that the lower court apparently 
misunderstood Appellant's argument, namely that Vance applied 
because the Commission reviewed the recommended decision of the 
ALJ and not because other brokers filed the charges against 
Respondent, the court held that a case alleging "being unworthy 
or incompetent" could not be heard by an ALJ except and unless 
the ALJ also found "one or more of the other seventeen listed 
proscribed activities," Memorandum Decision at 3. Two 
inferences are possible from the court's decision: (1) the 
standard, "being unworthy or incompetent," is simply too vague, 
or alternatively, (2) the hearing process, because it allows a 
case alleging "being unworthy or incompetent" to be tentatively 
decided by an ALJ, is constitutionally defective. 
Both inferences are unsound. The first is unsound 
because it misapplies the facts of the case to YJLUQ&t supra. The 
second is unsound because it disregards well settle principles of 
administrative law. 
A. The Commission May Delegate a Case Alleging "Being 
Unworthy or Incompetent* to an hU. 
Notwithstanding the lower court's reasoning, the 
Commission may delegate to an ALJ a case which alleges "being 
unworthy or incompetent" as a violation. Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-
12 (1953 as amended) repeatedly states that the Commission may 
delegate its authority to hear a case to an ALJ. Relevant 
hereto, S 61-2-12 states: 
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(1) (a) Before revoking, [or] suspending . . 
* any license, the Division shall schedule a 
hearing before the Commission or an Admini-
strative Law Judge designated by it . . . . 
The hearing of the charges shall be at a time 
and place as the Division prescribes, and 
shall be heard by the Commission or an admin-
istrative law judge designated by it. . . . 
(Emphasis added). Section 61-2-12 does not limit the cases an 
ALJ may hear to those alleging a specific disciplinary violation. 
Section 61-2-12 clearly grants authority to the Commission to 
delegate any case. Moreover, even absent express authority to 
delegate the physical hearing function, the Commission, as would 
any other administrative adjudicatory body, has implied to power 
to delegate the task to a hearing examiner. £££ Morgan v. United 
S£a_t££r 298 U.S. 468 (1936) (hereinafter "Morgan I") : HnitJid 
States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (hereinafter "Morgan TV"). 
B. Although the Hearing of a Case Alleging Violation 
of a General .Disciplinary Standard May Be Delegated 
To An ALJ, the Ultimate Decision Remains With The 
Commission and with the Executive Director of the 
Department of Business Regulations* 
Section 61-2-12 spec i f i ca l ly s t a t e s tha t the Commission 
and the Executive Director of the Department of Business 
Regulations remain ult imately responsible for the decis ion . 
Section 61-2-12(1) (b) in part s t a t e s : 
The Commission or the Administrative Law 
Judge shall render a decision within 60 days 
after the completion of any hearing* The 
executive Director and the Commission 
concurrent ly shal l make the f inal decision 
and shall promptly notify the part ies to the 
proceedings, in writing, of the ruling, 
order, or decision. 
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(Emphasis a d d e d ) ; see a l s o , BQard^jQjL.i^il£AtiQn pf SeYlgr County 
School D i s t r i c t v . Board of Reviev of the Department of 
Employment Secur i ty , 701 P.2d 1064, (Utah 1985). 
Moreover, i t i s well r ecogn ized in a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law 
t h a t , u n l e s s o therwise i n d i c a t e d by s t a t u t e , ALJ d e c i s i o n s a r e 
a d v i s o r y in n a t u r e ahd consequent ly a r e not binding on t h e u l t i -
mate d e c i s i o n maker. S t . Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U . S . . 298 
u . s . 38, 53 (1935); Federal Radio Comm. y. Nelsen Bros. Bon<3 & 
Mort. CO., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933) ; Heitmeyer v. F.C.C. , 68 
App.DC. 180 , 95 F.2d 91 , (1937) . Indeed , the u l t ima te d e c i s i o n 
maker may accep t or r e j e c t the f i n d i n g s of the ALJ or augment 
them where they a re considered l a c k i n g . Federal Radio Commission 
Y. Nelson B r o s . Bond &,Mortq» Co . , 289 U.S. 266; NLRB v . Oregon 
Worsted C o . , 94 F.2d 671 (9th C i r . 1938 ) . 
C. The Commission C a r e f u l l y Considered the Recommended 
Decision of the ALJ and Based ypyn Thf 
Cons idera t ion Affirmed The Decision of t h e ALJ, 
Concluding That Respondent Had Encaged In Acts 
Which Constituted "Being Unworthy or Incompetent," 
Notwiths tanding the Commission 's a u t h o r i t y to a c c e p t f 
r e j e c t , augment or modify the d e c i s i o n of the ALJf the "one who 
h e a r s must d e c i d e . " Morgan I a t 4 8 1 . Such, however, does not 
p r e c l u d e t h e d e l e g a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y t o an examiner t o conduct 
t h e p h y s i c a l hea r ing , but i n d i c a t e s t h a t the u l t ima te d e c i s i o n 
maker must c a r e f u l l y consider t h e ev idence and take 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n . 2&& Morgan IV a t 4 2 2 . 
_ I Q _ 
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To ca re fu l l y cons ide r t h e evidence and make an e n l i g h t e n e d dec i -
s ion one need not p e r s o n a l l y wi tness the ev idence nor read the 
tes t imony of w i t n e s s e s ; i t i s enough t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n maker 
add res s the d e c i s i o n "not un l ike the p r a c t i c e of j u d g e s in 
s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s . 1 1 IJCL. 
The Commission c a r e f u l l y cons idered t h e recommended 
d e c i s i o n of the ALJ a t i s s u e in t h i s ca se . The usua l procedure 
followed by the Commission in reviewing ALJ d e c i s i o n s of the 
complexity of the one a t i s s u e in t h i s case i s a s f o l l o w s : The 
Div is ion sends each member of the Commission a copy of the ALJ • s 
recommended d e c i s i o n approximate ly one to two weeks before the 
Commission i s to hold a meeting to consider i t and o t h e r i s s u e s . 
Each Commission member i s expected to come p r e p a r e d to the 
Commission mee t ing . At t h e meeting, the commiss ioners d i scuss 
the f ind ings of f a c t , conc lus ions of law and, i f s a n c t i o n s have 
been recommended by t h e ALJ, the p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y of those sanc-
t i o n s . The Commission r a r e l y d i spu tes the ALJ 's recommended 
f ind ings of f a c t . F r e q u e n t l y , the Commission d i s a g r e e s with the 
recommended o r d e r , and somewhat l e s s f r e q u e n t l y , w i t h the conclu-
s i o n s of law. If the Commission finds the ALJ•s recommended 
dec i s ion s a t i s f a c t o r y , i t i s affirmed. 
The review process of the Commission i s not a "rubber 
stamping" process . Such can be demonstrated by numerous cases in 
which the Commission has modified the recommended d e c i s i o n . For 
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example, the Commission has recently overturned an ALJ decision* 
In Case No. RE85-03-16, Tn the Matter of the License of Larry 
Lloyd to Act as a Real Estate Principal Broker, the Commission 
reversed an ALJ recommended order of dismissal. The Division 
therein alleged that Lloyd, the respondent, had violated several 
statutory provisions 'regulating brokers. The respondent moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Commission 
in a twelve page decision reversed the ALJ and remanded the 
action back to him for hearing. 
After reviewing the ALJ•s recommended decision in the 
present case, the Commission affirmed. The commissioners, based 
upon their knowledge of the profession, "(clonfirmed, approved 
and adopted" the recommended decision. At that instant, the 
decision became the decision of the Commission; it lost its 
character as a recommended decision of the ALJ. It, therefore 
should be reviewed as a decision of the Commission and not as 
that of the ALJ. 
D. "Being Unworthy or Incompetent" as Applied in the 
Case is not overly Broad nor Ambiguous under Vance 
Y. FordhajBt 
Vance Y, FQrdhaiflf £U££A, involved a challenge, intfilL 
jaJLLa# to the license revocation of Dr. Vance to practice as an 
osteopath. The constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. SS 58-1-13(6) 
and (7) was at issue* Those sections granted authority to the 
Division of Registration to revoke or suspend licenses for 
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"unprofessional conduct," Justice Oakesf writing for the Court, 
held that the Physicians' Licensing Board could "define 
unprofessional conduct," "on a case by case basis by drawing on 
the statutory standards . . . and on its own knowledge of the 
patient-care standards of the profession." Justice Oakes 
reasoned that "once a professional is certified," three 
justifications support the use of a general statutory standard 
such as "unprofessional conduct," namely; "(1) It] he subject of 
professional performance is too comprehensive to be codified in 
detail,; (2) [mlembers of a profession can be properly held to 
understand the standards of performance; land,] (3) [sltandards 
of performance will be interpreted by members of the profession 
in the process of administrative adjudication." Vance at 129. 
The only issue of concern herein which was not 
addressed by Vance is whether the adoption of the ALJ • s 
recommended decision satisfies Vance. In other words is the 
third justification given in Vance satisfied when the Commission 
adopts as its own the recommended decision of an ALJ. 
The third justification of Vance is satisfied in this 
case because of the Commission's review procedures and because of 
the substantial experience and knowlege the Commission applies 
when making a decision. 
The Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-5.5 
(1953 as amended) consists of five members, four of whom "have at 
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l e a s t f ive years1 experience in the real estate business and 
s h a l l hold an active p r inc ipa l broker, associate broker or sales 
agent l icense** Currently, three members are p r inc ipa l brokers 
and one i s an associate broker . At the time th is case was 
decided by the Commission, co l l ec t i ve ly , the members had over 
e ighty years of experience in real astate and real e s t a t e re la ted 
bus ine s se s . 
The past Chairman of the Commission, William Saa r i , who 
was chairman at the time the decision was considered, i s somewhat 
legendary . Mr. Saari i s the past president of the Sa l t Lake 
Board of Realtors, has served on several ethics committees, has 
served two terms on the Commission and has been a broker for 
f o r t y - t h r e e years. 
The present Commission Chairman, John A. Kerr (also 
p resen t on the Commission a t the time the ALJ's dec is ion herein 
was considered) has been a pr incipal broker for ten y e a r s , has 
held a real es ta te l icense for th i r teen years, taught rea l e s ta te 
educat ion at Utah State Universi ty for two years and has been on 
the Commission for three y e a r s . 
C. Patrick Wyman, another member of the Commission 
which considered Respondent's case, has been on the Commission 
for three years as well , Mr* Wyman has over thirty one years of 
experience in real e s ta te . Mr. Wyman was a licensed broker in 
Hawaii for sixteen years. He came to Utah in 1971 and has been a 
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principal broker in good standing since then. Additionally, Mr. 
Wyraan has served on the Professional Standards Committee for the 
Utah Association of Realtors. 
Jeraid S* Hawleyf another member of the decision-
rendering Commission, has been in the business of real estate for 
ten years and has been the President of the Central Utah Board of 
Realtors for the last three years. Mr. Hawley has likewise been 
a principal broker for the last three years. 
Marvin L. Hendrickson, the newest member of the Commis-
sion, was not on the Commission when the Topik decision was 
rendered. Nonetheless, he like the other members, is eminently 
qualified. Mr. Hendrickson has been in real estate for twenty-
three years, and has been a principal broker for fifteen years. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED .IN DECIDING THAT THE 
COMMISSION'S DECISION WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD 
Utah Code Ann. S 6 1 - 2 - 1 2 ( d ) (1953 a s amended) l i m i t s 
t h e s c o p e of r e v i e w of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o d e t e r m i n i n g whe the r 
" t h e e x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o r and t h e Commission have r e g u l a r l y p u r s u e d 
the ir author i ty and have not acted a r b i t r a r i l y . . . . * 
This Court in Utah Department of Administrative 
Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 p.2d 601 (Utah 1983), 
explained a s i m i l a r review standard. Concededly, Admin i s t r a t ive 
Se rv i ce s d e a l t with the review standards of the Public Service 
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Commission and not that of the Real Estate Commission. Nonethe-
less, the Court has recognized the general applicability of the 
review standards elucidated in Administrative Services. Seg 
Board of Education of Sevier County School District v. Board of 
Review of the Department of Employment Security, 701 P.2d 1064 
(Utah 1985); Administrative Services, 658 P.2d at 608f n.7. 
The Court enumerated three standards of review; (1) 
•general law - correction of error," (2) "findings of fact -
evidence of any substance whatever," (3) "other decisions -
reasonableness or rationality." Administrative Services at 608. 
The "general law -correction of error" standard 
"include [si interpretation(si of the United States Constitution 
and the acts of the Legislature (except those defined below as 
special laws)." JxL 
The "findings of fact - evidence of any substance 
whatever" standard extends to the "findings on questions of basic 
fact (which do not include 'ultimate facts' in the application of 
legal rules to basic facts. . . ) . " JJL. With respect thereto, a 
court may overturn administrative findings "only where they are 
'so without foundation in fact' that they 'must be deemed capri-
cious and arbitrary.'" IILL (emphasis in original). 
Finally, the "other decisions—reasonableness or 
rationality" standard includes "what has been described as 'mixed 
questions of law and fact1 or the 'application of findings of 
-24 -
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basic facts' (e.g., what happened) to the legal rules governing 
the case . . . and what can be called questions of ' special 
law.1* IsU at 610. Special law involves "interpretations .of. the 
operative provisions of the statutory law it [the administrative 
body] is empowered to administer, especially those generalized 
terras that bespeak a legislative intent to delegate their inter-
pretation to the responsible agency." IJJL In reviewing "agency 
decisions of this type . . . a court should afford great defer-
ence to the technical expertise or more extensive experience of 
the responsible agency." XsL Agency decisions in this category 
"must fall within the limits of reasonableness or rationality." 
HL. 
The District Court reversed the Commission's decision 
with respect to most of the Conclusions of Law, namely all the 
Conclusions which were adverse to Respondent. With respect to 
Conclusion numbers 4,6,7 and 9, the court ruled that the 
standard provided by S 61-2-11(8) "being unworthy or incompetent" 
could not be found by an ALJ except and unless a more specific 
disciplinary violation could be found as well. JS£& Point I, 
aJiGY£. 
The Court concluded with respect to Conclusion Number 1 
as follows: 
As to the first finding [Conclusion] that 
the broker had failed to furnish copies 
pursuant to subsection (9) (S 61-2-11(9)1 it 
is noted that the listing party by signature 
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acknowledges receipt of a copy of the docu-
ment, and the only apparent basis for the 
claimed violation is that the broker had no 
recollection of handing the document to the 
party but assumes he did. As to amending the 
documents or adding thereto, the information 
added to the document was nothing more than 
property details to better help the broker in 
marketing the property and wouJLd likely not 
be known by the owner without consulting pay-
ment records, tax receipts, etc. None of the 
added information altered the contract be-
tween the party and the broker nor endangered 
the public. 
Memorandum Decision at 3. 
The foregoing attack on the conclusion of the 
Commission normally requires application of the intermediate 
standard of review which requires that the conclusions under 
consideration be reasonable or rational (taking into account the 
agency's greater expertise in the profession). However, the 
court attacks not only the conclusion but the basic facts upon 
which it rests. 
To reach the decision stated above, the court had to 
refute 11 4 and 5 of the Findings of Fact. Such are supported, 
however, by substantial evidence. Respondent's own testimony at 
the hearing indicates that he took the signed copy of the listing 
agreement back to his office to fill it out based upon the prior 
listing from the multiple listing book and that he did not 
remember ever giving a copy of the agreement, after it had been 
filled out, to Ms, Tsosie. Transcript at 38, 
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The court then goes further and reasons tha t the 
Conclusion i s defec t ive because the e s s e n t i a l s of the contract 
were not a l t e r ed and the public was not endangered. Such 
reasoning f l i e s in the face of the intermediate standard of 
review. The Commission (who possesses the expe r t i s e ) concluded 
tha t Respondent v io l a t ed S 61-2-11(9). The Leg is la tu re deter-
mined that such had the procl iv i ty to endanger the public . By 
concluding as i t d id , the court, in essence overruled the 
Legislature and s u b s t i t u t e d i t s exper t i se for t h a t of the 
Commission. 
With respect to the second Conclusion the court s t a ted : 
As to the finding [Conclusion No. 2] that 
p a r t i e s were subjected to payment of a double 
commission the record is c lear t ha t the 
l i s t i n g was made with an owner who had repre-
sented t h a t he had terminated the prior 
l i s t i n g . While i t i s asser ted and not denied 
tha t another broker had obtained an extension 
of h i s l i s t i n g on the prQpertyf Topik removed 
his s igns from the property and made no claim 
for h i s own l i s t i n g upon rece ip t of the 
claimed ex tens ion . 
Memorandum Decision a t 3 , 4 . 
Again with respect the foregoing, the court subst i tu ted 
i t s exper t i se for t h a t the of Commission. The Commission 
concluded, based upon the basic f a c t s , i . e . , that Ms. Tsosie 
entered into a l i s t i n g agreement on May 5, 1982 with a term of 
six months, that the l i s t i n g agreement was extended to January 5, 
1983, that notice of the extension appeared in the October 29, 
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1982 "hot s h e e t , " that respondent l i s t e d the property on November 
5, or 6, 1982, tha t Respondent did not ask whether the pr ior 
l i s t i n g had been extended, and tha t Respondent placed his sign on 
the proper ty even though the sign for Century 21—Mountain Aire 
Realty was s t i l l there , that Ms, Tsosie had been subjected to a 
double commission by respondent. The fact that Topik removed h i s 
sign the next week (after being informed by the other broker) 
does not excuse the fact that two brokers , had the home been sold 
between November 5, or 6, 1982 and January 5, 1983, could have 
claimed a commission on the s a l e . The Commission's conclusion 
was thus reasonable . 
The court also by inference suggested tha t , at l e a s t 
under i t s reasoning, that the Commission could have found 
Respondent g u i l t y of viola t ing S 61-2-11(8) with respect to Fact 
S i tua t ion Number Four, had Respondent been charged and found 
gu i l ty of v i o l a t i n g S 61-2-11(7). Such i s i r re levant if 
Appel lan ts ' pos i t ion as described in Point I , above, i s accepted. 
The court clearly s u b s t i t u t e d i t s expert ise for t ha t of 
the Commission. Such is not allowed under a proper scope of 
review. Therefore, the cou r t ' s decis ion must be overturned. 
Furthermore, the c o u r t ' s ru l ing r e l a t ive to the 
vagueness of S 61-2-11(8) se r ious ly erodes the professional 
s tandards of the profession* Most of Respondent's ac t iv i ty as 
ou t l ined i n the fact situations above and not discussed by the 
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lower court are more than innocuous. If such acts are allowed to 
go unchecked, the public will suffer* 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission summarized rather succinctly why 
Respondent is a threat to the public. According to the 
Commission: 
Respondent's conduct in subjecting sellers 
to double commissions, failing to furnish 
copies of documents to parties executing 
them, altering documents after they had been 
executed, offering to sell property below the 
listed price, offering to pay illegal 
finders' fees, preparing ambiguous documents 
and duplicate documents with no indication of 
which supersedes which and failing to account 
for the transfer of earnest monies from one 
document to another cannot be condoned. We 
are not convinced that Mr. Topik is dis-
honest; we are not convinced that Mr. Topik 
lacks the ability—if he took the time—to 
structure a competent real estate trans-
action. We are convinced that in 31 years of 
wheeling and dealing Respondent has developed 
a habit of cutting corners to the extent that 
he poses a threat to the public health, 
safety and welfare. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 15, 16. 
Respondent's conduct as presented herein is one of many 
examples of why a general disciplinary standard is necessary. It 
allows a responsible decision maker, such as the Commission, to 
protect the public by determining whether a licensee has failed 
to comport himself in accordance with the accepted standards of 
the profession. 
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Likewise the review standard applicable to courts 
reviewing such decisions is skewed in favor of the professional 
decision maker and its considerable expertise in the profession. 
Wherefore, Appellants respectfully request that the 
decision rendered by the District Court be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2nd day of Hay, 1986 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General of Utah 
By: /*,*> 
ROBERT 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General 
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HAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing "Brief of Appellants" this 2nd day of 
May, 1986, with postage prepaid thereon, at Salt Lake City, Utah 
to the following: 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Nick Topik 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
•et^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY STATE OF UTMT^ ./•;:-; 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
TO ACT AS A REAL EST 
IN Z'dZ STATE OF UTAH 
TCPIK, 
' Civil No- 18944 
) 
The Broker in question appealed from the Order of the Executive 
Director of the Division and the Real Estate Comiriission confirming, 
approving and adopting the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
(hereafter ALJ) in recommending the suspension of the broker's license 
for a period of 150 days and a three year period of probation commenc-
ing at the termination of the suspension. 
The decision of the ALJ was based on a consideration of nine 
fact situations, some of which were found to constitute no violation 
and others found to violate U.C.A. Section 61-2-11 (9) failure to 
furnish copies of documents, Section 61-2-11 (8) subjecting a client 
to double commissions and advertising property lower than the listing 
price without written consent, Section 61-2-11 ;&) of ferine tc pay 
a finders fee to an unlicensed person, Section 62-2-11 (S) amending 
an offer without obtaining indication of consent of buyers, Section 
61-2-11 (S) approximating as the 'balance cue1 on a listing as 
"approximately $37,000.00" when the actual balance was $37,950.00, 
and 61-2-11 (S) preparing multiple documents, listing and/cr earnest 
money offers without indicating which ones were bindinc and bv addin:-
LICENSE 
OF KICK y;E:-:c:j^ :ou:-: D E C I S I O N 
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Section 61-2-11 provides in relevant part that: 
"the commission - may suspend, revoke, place en probation, 
or deny re-issuance of any license issued under this chapter 
at any time if the licensee 
- in performing or attempting to perform any of the acts 
specified in this chapter is found guilty of: (8) being 
unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker, 
associate broker, or sales agent in such manner as to safe-
guard the interests of the public; 
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies of all documents 
to all parties executing the documents.11 
Appellant argues that 61-2-11 (8) is vague and uncertain and 
affords no standard by which a party can be judged citing principally 
two Utah Cases, Athay vs. State Department of Business Regulation 
626 P2, 965, and Vance vs. Fordham 671 P2, 124. The Commission relies 
also on the Vance vs. Fordham Case wherein the court held that 
"unprofessional conduct" in a medical doctor licensing case was an 
adequate statutory standard and arguing therefore "being unworthy 
or incompetent" in a real estate broker's case is likewise an adequate 
statutory standard. Commission counsel noted that in the Vance case 
the referred to standards of performance would be interpreted 
by members of the profession in the process of administrative 
adjudication and equates that to other brokers filin- the charges 
herein, even thouch no other brokers appeared and testified at the 
hearing before the ALJ . To be specific the Division argues in the 
first full.paragraph on Page 9, 
" Aoolyinc the foregoing principle.cf lav: to this case, 
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yields but one conclusion: Mr. Topik!s license suspension 
was considered by a group of his peers who decided he was 
"unworthy or incompetent to act a a principal broker . . . 
in such a manner as to safeguard the interest, of the public. 
Such was the decision considered and made by Mr. Topik's 
peers and therefore satisfies the requirements of Vance." 
This court does not accept the Divisions conclusions as to 
lie application of the Vance interpretation to the case at bar and 
herefore rejects the findings of the ALJ of violations of 61-2-11 (8), 
xcept and unless the broker's conduct also violated one or more of 
.he other seventeen listed proscribed activities. As was pointed out 
.n one of the Division's cited cases, competence is not perfection 
:nd the ALJ found much of the broker's conduct was either innocuous 
:>r resulted in no damage or injury to any person. 
As to the first finding that the broker had failed to furnish 
copies pursuant to subsection (9) it is noted that the listing party 
by signature acknowledges receipt of a copy of the document, and the 
only apparent basis for the claimed violation is that the broker had 
no recollection of handing the document to the party but assumes he 
did. As to amending the documents or adding thereto, the information 
added to the document was nothing more than property details to better 
help the broker in marketing the property and would likely not be kncwn 
by the owner without consulting payment records, ta:»: receipts, etc. 
^one of the added information altered the contract between the party 
and the broker nor endangered the public. 
7-.s to the finding that parties were subjected to payment of a 
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ble coTTimission the record is clear that the listing was made with 
owner who had represented that he had terminated the prior listing. 
.le it is asserted and not denied that another broker had obtained 
extension of his listing on the property, Topik removed his signs 
om the property and made no claim for his own listing upon receipt 
the claimed extension. 
As to the ALJ*s finding of violation of 61-2-11 (8) by offering 
} pay a finderfs fee to an unlicensed person, it would appear that 
f such were the case the broker had violated subsection 61-2-11 (7), 
hat is: 
" - performing or attempting to perform any act specified -
(7) paying valuable consideration as defined by the commission, 
to any person not licensed under this chapter, - ". 
Exhibit No. 12 is an advertisement run by the broker proclaiming that 
any person to whom the broker sells property or refers persons to 
whom property is sold would be elibible for a $100.00 gift certificate, 
The record is silent as to why this conduct did not amount to at least 
an attempt to pay valuable consideration to persons not licensed under 
z:.: chapter, but the record is devoid of any further reference or 
in.;ication why such was not found. 
Accordingly the order of the Executive birector and Commission 
is reversed, each party to pay their.own litigation expenses. 
Dated this /'.y m'~ day of January, 1986. ' 
EY THE COURT: > / ^ ' 
.'f ' 
C;.1'IJ"" J l S i i'.iC i' u U O L 
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HAILING CERTIFICATE 
Copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision nailed this 15th 
day of January, 1956, to Robert A. Echard, Attorney for Respondent, 
427 27th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401 and to Robert B. Hicks, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Jay R. Hirschi 
Box Elder County Clerk 
Bv " " ". r~ ;., C 
\-; Deputy «_/' 
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BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License of 
NICK TOPIK 
to Act as a Real Estate Broker 
in the State of Utah 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
No. RE-83-05-17 * 
Appearances: 
Nicholas Hales for the Real Estate Commission 
Richard Echard for the Respondent 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
Pursuant to notice duly served by certified mail, this matter came on 
regularly for hearing on August 27 and 28, 1984, before Kent Walgren, 
Administrative Law Judge for the Utah Department of Business Regulation. 
A Pre-Hearing Conference was convened on March 8, 1984 and a Pre-Hearing 
Order issued August 14, 1984. On August 27, 1984 the parties agreed to 
the following amendments in the Pre-Hearing Order: (1) Delete the last 
sentence of paragraph 9; (2) Delete the penultimate sentence of 
paragraph 10; (3) Delete the last sentence of paragraph 14. The 
Pre-Hearing Order is so amended. The Division moved to dismiss without 
prejudice Fact Situation #8 and the Counts relating thereto, which motion 
was granted; in the event it is not re-filed before October 11, 1984, it 
shall automatically be dismissed with prejudice. 
Evidence was offered and received and the Administrative Law Judge, 
having been fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.-2-
following recommended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at all times relevant to these proceedings has 
been, a licensee of the Real Estate Division of the State of Utah. 
Fact Situation #1 
2. Rosalie Tsosie, as owner of certain real property located at 30 
West 700 North in Brigham City, Utah, listed her property with C-21 
Mountain Aire Realty, Inc. of Brigham City. The listing began May 5, 
1982 with a term of six months. Sometime in or about the latter part of 
October, 1982, Ms. -Tsosie extended the listing to January 5, 1983. 
Although notice of the extension of the listing appeared in the October 
29, 1982, "Hot Sheet" of the Brigham-Tremonton Association of Realtors, 
of which Respondent is a member, we find that Respondent was unaware of 
the extension. >s-
3. The initial listing would have expired November 5, 1982. On 
November 5 or 6, Respondent visited Ms. Tsosie about obtaining the 
listing for Western Hills Realty. Being unsophisticated in real property 
transactions, Ms. Tsosie did not understand that she was subjecting 
herself to a double commission; Respondent apparently did not ask if the 
prior listing had been extended. 
4. On the listing form, using a blue-ink pen, Respondent filled in 
the asking price, the listing date and expiration date, the construction 
material of the house ("brick") and noted that "People from Florida are 
exempt." Then Respondent completed the bottom of the form (see Division 
Exhibit 5) and had Ms. Tsosie sign listing and sign again that she had 
received a copy of it. Respondent then placed a sign for Western Hills 
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Gonzales apparently believed he had authority to unilaterally terminate 
the listing and that the telephone call accomplished same. No written 
release was requested or obtained. Wardley considered the listing valid 
at all times. 
9. On July 31, 1982 Topik approached Gonzales about listing the 
property. Gonzales told Respondent: "If you want to, go ahead.'* 
Thereupon, Respondent had Gonzales execute a two month listing with 
Western Hills. Respondent knew the property had been listed with Wardley 
but accepted Gonzales* verbal assertion that he had terminated the 
listing. Respondent made no attempt to contact either Wardley or the MLS 
to ascertain whether or not the listing was still valid. 
10. Respondent knew, or should have known, that one party to a 
written listing agreement cannot unilaterally terminate the agreement on 
a whim. Respondent also knew, or should have known (by reviewing the MLS 
book), that Wardley's listing did not expire until September 28, 1982. 
Under the circumstances, Respondent had a duty to make reasonable 
inquiries to assure that the Wardley listing was no longer in effect. By 
violating this duty, he subjected Gonzales to liability for paying two 
commissions. Respondent's failure to inquire also constitutes 
incompetence. 
Fact Situation £1 
11. Joan Stevens listed with Topik her property located at 672 North 
100 West, Brigham City, Utah, for $65,500. On account of a VA appraisal 
(and by written agreement), the listing price was subsequently reduced to 
$64,100. The VA appraisal was contingent upon the completion of certain 
repairs which Mr. Topik ascertained would cost $10,593.20 (see 
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without the written consent of the seller, Respondent violated Section 
11.f. of the Rules and Regulations of Division. 
15. The Division alleges that Respondent substantially 
misrepresented the terms of purchase by advertising that no down payment 
was required. Although the advertisement stated "XOOO.OO minimum down", 
we find that it was a typographical error (should have been "5000.00 
minimum down") caused by inadvertently touching the shift key when typing 
the number 5. Since the error was caused by sloppiness rather than being 
intentional, we find no violation of Section 61-2-11(1). 
16. The Division's allegation that Respondent obtained keys without 
permission and entered Ms. Stevens' units without prior appointments was 
unsubstantiated by the evidence. We find no violation of Section 
61-2-11(8). 
Fact Situation #4 
17. Topik, as principal broker of Western Hills Realty, had 
promotional flyers printed and distributed bearing the name, address, and 
telephone number of his brokerage and offering to give a $100.00 gift 
certificate to any person "when we list and sell your home ojr one 
referred by you" (emphasis added). The Division alleges that such is a 
violation of Section 61-2-11(15), in that Respondent willfully and 
deliberately 
encouraged unlicensed persons to violate the provisions of Utah Real 
Estate Licensing Law by referring prospects to Topik in the 
expectation of receiving valuable consideration and thereby 
subjecting them to possible criminal prosecution." (Amended Petition, 
paragraph 53) 
Respondent was never requested by the Division to cease distribution of 
the leaflets and there is no other evidence on the record indicating that 
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have been more explicit, we cannot find that the January 18f 1983, 
Earnest Money agreement, the only one presented to the sellers, is so 
defective as to demonstrate incompetence within the meaning of Section 
61-2-11(8). 
Fact Situation £6 
21. Topik prepared an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
dated February 10, 1983 on a property located at 1099 Oak, Brigham City. 
The purchasers were Donald and Eleanor Speers. The total purchase price 
was shown as $49,000 with a $50. earnest money. The balance of the terms 
of purchase were swelled out in the body of the offer. Vhen Topik 
presented the Earnest Money Offer to the listing broker, Ed Tugaw, Mr. 
Tugaw noted that there were some possible deficiencies in the terms. 
Topik took the signed offer from Mr. Tugaw and wrote in on line 24 and 25 
"Buyer will apply for a General Electric Loan. Seller to pay 3 1/2 
points." On lines 28 and 29 of the form there were two blank spaces 
which had not been filled in, which Topik then filled in with the terms 
pertinent to the interest rate and date of closing. Topik then handed 
the document back to Mr. Tugaw and requested that he present the document 
to the seller without returning to the prospective buyers to have them 
initial the additions. The offer was countered by the seller; when the 
buyers accepted the counter-offer they were also accepting Respondent's 
changes. 
22. In amending the offer without obtaining some indication of • 
consent from the buyers, Respondent demonstrated incompetence within the 
meaning of Section 61-2-11(8). In mitigation, the buyers ratified the 
additions on the same day and no one was injured. 
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at least two other real property transactions since this one) agreed 
verbally to purchase the home as follows: Total purchase price: 
$45,800; Terms: Mayne to pay $30,000 cash ($5000 down and $25,000 at 
closing) and assume an existing mortgage in the amount of approximately 
$15t800. The parties agreed to close on or about June 15, 1983, at which 
time Mayne would have available the cash necessary to close the sale. In 
early May, 1983, Mayne gave Rucker the $5,000 down payment, thereby 
obtaining an equitable interest in the property; no written documents 
were executed. Rucker knew that she was selling the home considerably 
below market value;* she needed to move and, as she explained to Mayne, 
the home needed a new roof. 
28. Mayne initially considered occupying.the home but his wife 
decided it was too far from church and shopping facilities so in early 
May, 1983 Mayne decided to contact his friend and fishing buddy of ten 
years, Nick Topik. The first few tiroes Mayne went by Respondent's 
office, he was out. The agents who were there encouraged Mayne to list 
the property but he said he wanted to sell it, not list it (he didn't 
want to pay the 6% sales commission). About mid-^ay, Mayne met with 
Topik at the latter*s office. Mayne told Topik he had purchased the 
Rucker home, and that he wanted to turn it over for a $3000 profit (there 
is a dispute here: Topik testified at the hearing that he agreed to pay 
Mayne $2500 profit), and that he would sell it to Topik for $49,500. 
Mayne did not tell Topik about the $5000 he had already paid to Rucker. 
29. On May 24, 1983, Mayne and Topik signed an Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase with the following terms: Total Purchase Price: 
$49,500; Earnest Money: $500; Payment when Mayne accepts sale: $4500; 
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(The record is not clear whether Mayne retained Topik1s $500 earnest 
money noted in the May 2k Earnest Money agreement; did this, added to the 
$2500, constitute Mayne's $3000 profit? The closing statements are 
silent about the $500.) There are two copies of the May 27, 1983 Earnest 
Money agreement (Division Exhibits 18 and 19), both of which are 
identical with the exception of a few additional filled-in blanks on 
Exhibit 19. It appears that after Topik had Rucker sign the agreement he 
tore off a copy and left it with Rucker (Exhibit 18) and took the 
remaining carbons (to which he at some point added a few inocuous 
details) to Mayne for his signature. Although the purchase prices in the 
May 2k and May 27 Earnest Money agreements are identical, the terms 
differ. In the May 27 agreement, Topik notes having paid $560 earnest 
money to Rucker (which does appear on the closing statements), the 
$15,800 assumption, and the balance of $33,140 to be paid as follows: 
(a) $25,600 by a loan from Mayne to Topik ($200/month, payments at 
9*—the loan from Mayne to Topik is substantially identical to the May 2k 
agreement); and (b) the remaining $7,540 presumably to be paid in cash at 
closing by Topik. The mystery of the May 27 Earnest Money agreement is 
how the figure of $560 (earnest money to Rucker) was arrived at. There 
is some evidence that Mayne also paid Rucker $650 for some items of 
personal property that eventually went with the house; perhaps that 
figure is somehow related to the personal property. No one who testified 
at the hearing, Topik included, was able to recall all the details and 
the documents are less than ideal, never mentioning whether one document 
supersedes another, never mentioning transfers of earnest monies. The 
May 27 Earnest Money agreement does state that Topik is a licensed Real 
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transaction on the day of closing. Subsequently, however, Mayne1s 
children discovered that Mayne had invested $25,600 at 9X interest over 
36 years and cried foul. 
34. We are not convinced that the Division's tendency to portray 
Mayne as a naive elderly gentleman who was duped by the Respondent is 
wholly accurate. Mayne can still read without the help of glasses. 
Those who know Mayne testified they respect his shrewdness as a 
"horse-trader." We are inclined to believe Topik when he said he made it 
clear that this was a private, arms-length deal. We are convinced that 
Mayne knew he was leaning money to Topik—perhaps not exactly for 36 
years, but for enough years that Mayne knew he wouldn't be around to 
collect it. Thus we find no substantial misrepresentation as alleged by 
the Division in Count 10, no false promises as alleged in Count 13, and 
no dishonest dealing as alleged in Count 15. Mayne seems to have been 
content with the transaction until his children objected and until he 
discovered the price for which Topik had resold the home. 
35. Inasmuch as Mayne obtained an equitable interest in the property 
when he paid $5000 to Rucker, Mayne's $2500 profit, however denominated, 
was not technically a finder's fee. Even though there were no written 
documents between Rucker and Mayne, Mayne's partial performance on their 
verbal agreement may well have made the agreement enforceable in equity 
despite the Statute of Frauds. We thus can find no violation under Count 
6 of the Petition. 
36. We do find that Respondent's preparation of multiple documents 
with no indication of which was to be binding, his failure to account for 
earnest monies being transfered from one document to another, and his 
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them, altering documents after they had been executed, offering to sell 
property below the listed price, offering to pay illegal finders* fees, 
preparing ambiguous documents and duplicate documents with no indication 
of which supersedes which and failing to account for the transfer of 
earnest monies from one document to another cannot be condoned. We are 
not convinced that Mr. Topik is dishonest; we are not convinced that hr. 
Topik lacks the ability—if he took the time—to structure a competent 
real estate transaction. We are convinced that in 31 years of wheeling 
and dealing Respondent has developed a habit of cutting corners to the 
extent that he posers a threat to the public health, safety and welfare. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Real Estate Broker$s License of 
NICK TOPIK be, and the same hereby is, suspended for a period of 150 days; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent's Real Estate Broker's License 
be, and the same hereby is, placed on probation for a period of three (3) 
years, said probation to commence at the termination of the 
aforementioned suspension. 
In the event Respondent further violates any statute or rule 
governing the conduct of Real Estate Brokers in the State of Utah during 
any period of suspension or probation, he shall be ordered to appear and 
show cause why his License to Act as a Broker in the State of Utah should 
not be revoked. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 1984. 
^Xl^%L,r 
KENT WALGREN, Administrative Law Judge 
i/U-
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